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TAXES, CONSCIENCE, AND THE
CONSTITUTION
Steven D. Smith*

I. TAX EXPENDITURES AND THE CLAIMS OF

CONSCIENCE
Al Agnostic and Betty Basic are neighbors-and citizens.
They are also taxpayers. As humans, they do not especially relish
paying taxes, but as citizens they understand that taxes are a civic
necessity and obligation. Like most citizens, Al and Betty approve
of some of the uses to which their tax dollars are devoted, and they
disapprove of other uses. Sometimes they disapprove on grounds of
policy: they simply do not think that particular expenditures are a
good use of public funds. Sometimes their disapproval runs deeper:
they might express this deeper opposition by saying that they are
opposed "in conscience" to particular expenditures of public
money.
Naturally, the specific expenditures that provoke such scruples differ as between Al and Betty. As an agnostic, Al opposes
public expenditures that he sees as supporting or advancing religion. So he objects to the inclusion of religious institutions in
publicly-supported programs established to provide social services like job training or drug rehabilitation (the so-called "faithbased initiatives"), and he also opposes the subsidization of religious schools (as in so-called voucher programs). By contrast,
Betty is supportive of these types of expenditures. But as an
evangelical Christian she is conscientiously opposed to programs
that she sees as supporting or condoning premarital sex. And she
is especially pained to think that her tax dollars are being used in
the public schools to support the teaching of evolution and other
ideas that she believes to be false, corrosive of civic virtue, and

* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank Larry
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subversive of what she regards as the saving faith that she hopes
to instill in her children and neighbors. 1
So, do either Al's or Betty's objections have any sort of constitutional status? More specifically, can Al or Betty plausibly
claim a constitutional right to freedom of conscience that is violated when he or she is forced to pay taxes that will be used in
part for these objectionable purposes?
It is not hard to imagine a possible (though perhaps not very
viable) argument suggesting that both Al and Betty's objections
ought to have constitutional status. Al and Betty might join in
urging the proposition that in a community that respects "the
sanctity of conscience," citizens should not be forced to subsidize
governmental activities to which they are conscientiously opposed. The First Amendment, with its assorted clauses protecting the free exercise of religion and the freedom of speech, is
sometimes viewed as a haven for conscience. 2 So Al and Betty
might try to anchor their appeals to conscience in that amendment.
In the abstract, it should not be hard to appreciate the appeal-and the logic-of this argument. Nor should it be hard to
appreciate the overwhelming practical objections that the argument will provoke. After all, many citizens and taxpayers will
say, sincerely, that they are opposed in conscience to any number of things that (with the support of their tax dollars) government doc:s. Some citizens are conscientiously opposed to particular (or all) military activities, others to particular government
funded programs in the arts or in science, others to an array of
"liberal" or "conservative" social programs. We can appreciate
the problem if we let our imaginations run just a little and suppose that Al's and Betty's argument were actually accepted by
the courts: millions of citizens who have been thus encouraged to
develop bloated consciences might thereby excuse themselves
from all manner of taxes.
That nightmare may easily lead us to the opposite conclusion: neither Al nor Betty should be deemed to have a valid objection. More generally, objections of conscience cannot be perI. Citizens with this perspective are recognized in both scholarly and judicial legal
literature. See, e.g., Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV.
581 (1993); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
2. See, e.g., J. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293,
1297 (1993) (describing '"the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First
Amendment"') (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)).
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mitted to excuse citizens from their basic civic obligation to pay
taxes, even if these citizens have sincere moral objections (as
many surely will) to some of the things government does with
their money. 3
So there is an intelligible argument for accepting both Al's
and Betty's claims of conscience, and there is a realistically more
acceptable argument for rejecting both arguments. We can also
imagine an argument that might support Betty's claim of conscience but not Al's. After all, our Constitution does not explicitly recognize any "freedom of conscience" -such language was
proposed when the First Amendment was drafted, only to be rejected4- but the Constitution does have a provision recognizing
the right to "free exercise of religion." We can stipulate that Al's
and Betty's objections are equally sincere and equally conscientious, but we have also supposed that Betty's objection is
grounded in religious belief; Al's is not. So Betty's claims may
seem more at home in the Constitution as it is written. 5
Can we imagine an argument for the opposite result-for
recognizing Al's claim of conscience but not Betty's? At least on
first reflection, this alternative seems untenable. As noted, Al
cannot as plausibly invoke the protection of the right to "free
exercise of religion." Nor can he as easily ground his objection in
the rationales that historically were offered for protecting rights
of free exercise or of conscience. Claims of conscience were typically asserted in reaction to attempts to coerce people in matters
of religion, and according to the classic defenses developed by
luminaries like Roger Williams and John Locke and James
Madison, 6 such coercion was wrong because forced worship or
religiosity is unacceptable to God-it "stincks in God's Nostrills," in Williams's pungent phrase. 7 It is doubtful whether
Betty can successfully assert this rationale in this context, 8 but
3. This rejection would seem to apply as well, perhaps a fortiori, to citizens who
have conscientious objections not to the way their tax dollars arc spent, but to the payment of taxes itself. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
4. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1481-84 (1990).
5. For an assessment of the question whether the free exercise clause protects
nonreligious manifestations of conscience, see Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion
Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 911 (2005).
6. For an overview, sec REX AHDAR & IAl' LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 22-36 (2005)
7. See Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 289, 297 (2005). For a more recent version of this rationale, see
JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 49-57 (1996).
8. Betty can claim that payment of taxes for this purpose violates God's will, but
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surely Al cannot cogently invoke it: after all, Al does not even
believe that God exists.
So perhaps we should be surprised to learn that a common
view today, advocated by jurists like Justice David Souter 9 and
by scholars like Noah Feldman, 10 would recognize Al's claim of
conscience while politely declining to notice Betty's. Moreover,
people who take this view often try to support it by quoting language from venerable sources such as James Madison and Thomas J efferson. 11 It is a curious position but also a longstanding
one-and one that is arguably at the core of the distinctively
American commitment to the nonestablishment of religion. Let
us investigate that position more closely.
II. FROM CONSCIENCE (THROUGH TAXES)
TO NONESTABLISHMENT?
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 12 the Supreme Court upheld
a Cleveland voucher program that included religious schools
among the institutions eligible to receive public funding. Dissenting, Justice Souter argued that the program violated the consciences of taxpayers, and he quoted in support of this claim
James Madison's famous statement that conscience is offended
by any law that would "force a citizen to contribute three
pence ... of his property for the support of any ... establishment."13
The basic argument had been made countless times before,
of course. And in a sense it seems almost truistic: if the Constitution forbids government to establish religion (a proposition that
by now is very well settled 14 ), and if the inclusion of religious
schools in a more general program of educational support is an
establishment of religion (a proposition that remains hotly contested), then it would seem to follow that the Cleveland voucher
program violated the Constitution-even if the amount of funding directed to religious schools was relatively small (as it arguashe cannot cogently make the classical argument about the inefficacy of forced worship,
since the government is not attempting to induce her to worship.
9. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
10. See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 33-43,246-47 (2005).
11. See id. at 33-43.
12. 536 u.S. 639 (2002).
13. !d. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting).
14. For at least the first century or so of the Republic, the prevailing view had been
that the First Amendment prohibited the national government but not the states from
establishing religion. The turning point came with Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
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bly was not). "No aid" separationists have been making this argument almost from time immemorial, 15 or so it seems, and in
the last century their position often prevailed (though perhaps
less often toward the end of the century than closer to the middle)16.
This argument can be made, however, and often is made,
without any invocation of freedom of conscience. The "no aid"
separationist can simply point out that the First Amendment
contains a clause forbidding establishments of religion and then
argue that a voucher program including religious schools transgresses this prohibition. There seems to be no need to bring individual conscience into the argument at all. Conversely, "freedom of conscience" would seem to resonate more naturally with
the free exercise clause than with the nonestablishment prohibition.
Why then did Justice Souter emphasize that the allocation
of public money to religious education violated the consciences
of taxpayers? Though we can only guess at Souter's particular
motivations, we can also imagine reasons why "no aid" separationists might want to assert a link between freedom of conscience, taxes, and nonestablishment. Let us briefly notice four
such reasons.
First, a commitment to nonestablishment might be made
stronger, and more rhetorically powerful, if tied to a commitment to freedom of conscience. The case for respecting conscience is arguably more compelling than the case for constitutionally mandated nonestablishment. Conscience is an intimate
personal concern-one that looks and sounds like the subject of
a "right," even a "natural right"- while nonestablishment is more
institutional and structural and abstract. Long before arguments
for religious disestablishment went mainstream, major theorists
like Locke along with scores of by-now-forgotten golemicists
were pressing arguments for freedom of conscience. 7 Even today, international human rights law embraces freedom of conscience but does not mandate nonestablishment. 18 And nations
15.

(2002).
16.

See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

For an overview of these developments, see JoHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 149-84 (2000).
17. For a scholarly overview of the historical developments, see ANDREW
MURPHY, CONSCIENCE AND COMMUNITY: REVISITING TOLERATION AND RELIGIOUS
DISSENT IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (2001 ).
18. See Michael J. Perry, Whm Do the Free Exercise and Nonestablishment Norms
Forbid?: Reflections on the ConstitLltional Law of Religious Freedom, 1 UNIV. OF ST.
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we regard as civilized and progressive and supportive of religious
freedom- England,
for
example- maintain
established
churches.
In short, standing alone, the constitutional commitment to
nonestablishment may seem vulnerable. Perhaps that commitment would be rendered more secure if it could be tied successfully into the more unassailable right to freedom of conscience.
Second, and more technically, linking nonestablishment to
conscience may solidify the anomalous doctrine whereby taxpayers are treated as having legal standing to challenge violations of the nonestablishment provision. Typically, the fact that a
person pays taxes is not enough to permit him to bring a lawsuit
challenging a constitutional infraction, 19 even one involving the
expenditure of public funds; the successful plaintiff needs to be
able to assert a more concrete and particularized injury. 20 Even if
the consequence of this requirement is that no one has standing
to challenge a constitutional violation, the courts have sometimes insisted on a showing of such personalized harm. 21 In the
area of nonestablishment, however, the courts have departed
from this ~osition, routinely allowing litigants to claim "taxpayer
standing." 2 Erwin Chemerinsky reports that "the only situation
in which taxpayer standing appears permissible is if the plaintiff
challenges a ~overnrnent expenditure as violating the establishment clause." 3
But why? The Supreme Court's own explanation of the exception borders on gibberish. 24 But if taxpayers can plausibly
claim that the use of their money to advance religion violates
their consciences, then arguably the requisite personalized harm
would be present. After all, a violation of conscience seems
about as personal a harm as one could hope for.

THOMAS L.J. 549, 564 (2003) (observing that "the international law of human rights does
not include anything like the American nonestablishment norm").
19. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
20. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALllJRISDICTION 52 (1989).
21. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
22. For a recent instance with a scholarly opinion by Judge Richard Posner and a
thoughtful dissent by Judge Kenneth Ripple, see Freedom from Religion Foundation v.
Chao, 74 U.S.L.W. 1446 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding taxpayer standmg m suit challengmg
Bush Administration program promoting "faith-based initiatives")
23. CIIE~ERINSKY, supra note 20, at 82.
24. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See especially the dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan.
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Third, if state monetary support for religion violates the
consciences of taxpayers, a long-standing embarrassment in the
constitutional doctrine of "incorporation" might be allayed. As
all law students know, the Bill of Rights did not originally apply
to the states, nor did the Supreme Court ever hold that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights per se against
the states (Justice Black notwithstanding). Instead, the Court
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause included certain substantive rights that were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 25 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. " 26 And the Court treated various provisions
in the Bill of Rights as authoritative expressions of some of these
rights. Though often critical of the path taken by the Court,
scholars have argued for a similar overall outcome by contending that rights contained in the Bill of Rights should have been
treated as among the "privile.pes and immunities" referred to in
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
Under these "rights" rationales, it is easy enough to say that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the free exercise
clause-or perhaps some more general right to freedom of conscience emanating from the free exercise and free speech
clauses. 28 But it is conceptually awkward to say that a merely
structural limitation on the national government was somehow
incorporated against the states. Thus, scholars and jurists have
sometimes argued that the establishment clause (at least in its
original meaning) could not have been incorporated against the
states: the claim simply defies logic. 29 But if the payment of taxes
to be used for religious purposes violates the taxpayers' rights of
conscience, so that nonestablishment is a corollary of freedom of
conscience, then this objection is readily overcome. That is because, once again, a right of conscience has a strong claim to being "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
Finally, for those who believe that "original meaning"
should count heavily or decisively in constitutional interpretation, linking "no aid" nonestablishment to freedom of conscience might be helpful in parrying a threatening interpretation
of the original meaning of the religion clauses. In recent years,
25.
26.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937).
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977).
27. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 181-87 (1998).
28. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
29. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 27, at 41. See also Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700 (1992).
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some scholars Uoined recently by Justice Clarence Thomas 30 )
have argued that the establishment clause was not originally intended to constitutionalize any particular substantive principle
or right of religious freedom, but was merely intended to confirm the jurisdictional arrangement whereby relipion was a matter for the states, not the national government. 3 One argument
in support of this jurisdictional interpretation grows out of the
fact of widespread disagreement during the founding period
about the proper relation between government and religion:
some citizens and states (Jefferson, and Virginia, for example)
had concluded that government should not support religion, but
other citizens and states (such as the Congregationalists in Massachusetts and Connecticut) believed that government support
for religion was proper and necessary. Given this disagreement,
supporters of the jurisdictional interpretation ask, how could
Americans have converged to approve any substantive principle
of religious freedom or nonestablishment? Instead, the Framers
steered around substantive differences by simply agreeing that
jurisdiction over such matters would remain where it had always
been-with the states. 32
Opponents of this jurisdictional interpretation typically argue that despite their conspicuous differences, Americans of the
period agreed on certain general principles in matters of religion.
Specifically, they shared a commitment to freedom of conscience.33 But even if it is persuasive, the argument asserting a
consensus on conscience would seem most pertinent to the free

30. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,726 (2005) (Thomas, 1., concurring).
31. I have argued at length for this interpretation elsewhere. Steven D. Smith, The
Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843
(2006); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).
32. Douglas Laycock, though a critic of this interpretation, explains that "[t]hcre
was not yet a consensus for disestablishment, which suggests that the Founders might not
have been able to agree on a substantive understanding of the Establishment Clause. But
they did not have to agree on disestablishment; they had to agree only on what powers
they were denying to the federal government." Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology
Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But
Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 241-42 (2004). See also Daniel 0. Conkle,
Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1113, 1133-35
(1988).
33. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 27-33. For Feldman's more developed
argument, see Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
NYU L. REV. 346 (2002). See also Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment
Clause: A Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 761, 775 (2005) ("Moreover, Americans
throughout the fourteen nascent states agreed that freedom of religious conscience was
an essential right.").
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exercise clause. What does that argument have to do with the establishment clause?
While exploring various difficulties with the argument,
Noah Feldman suggests that "no aid" nonestablishment can be
34
derived from the shared commitment to freedom of conscience.
Why? Because forcing taxpayers to support religions contrary to
their beliefs is a violation of their freedom of conscience. So if
Americans of the period agreed in supporting freedom of conscience, they effectively agreed on a principle of "no financial
aid" to religion as well.
III. CONNECfiONS HISTORICAL AND
LOGICAL-OR NOT
In sum, the contention linking conscience to nonestablishment via taxes may be important to the separationist position
(and, arguably, to the distinctive American commitment to nonestablishment itself) in a variety of ways. This contention can be
advanced or understood in two quite different senses, or in terms
of what we can call "the historical claim" and "the entailment
claim." (In actual debate, of course, these claims usually are not
clearly distinguished.)
The historical claim asserts that founding era Americans believed that the use of tax money for religious purposes was a violation of conscience. They may have been right or they may have
been wrong, but this was what they believed; and their belief was
constitutionalized in the First Amendment. Or at least so runs
the claim. The entailment claim, by contrast, asserts that whatever Americans may have believed, or whatever they may believe today, the use of tax money for religious purposes just is a
violation of conscience. So if our Constitution protects freedom
of conscience, a principle of "no aid" to religion logically follows.
Interesting questions might arise if we were to conclude that
the historical claim is correct but the entailment claim is not.
What would follow, in other words, if we concluded that the
founding generation believed that the use of tax money for religious purposes violated conscience but that their belief was (and
is) mistaken? Should we conclude that the founding generation's
belief, however misguided, was cemented into the Constitution,
so that short of constitutional amendment we are bound by that
belief despite its deficiencies? Or should we instead conclude
34.

Feldman, supra note 33, at 418-25.
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that the case is comparable to that of the Fourteenth Amendment and the principle of racial equality? In discussions of
Brown v. Board of Education, for example, it has become a sort
of commonplace that the Framers believed they could constitutionalize equality without dismantling racial segregation in
schools and other contexts, but we now realize that they were
mistaken about the implications of their principle, and we are
bound to respect what the principle really means, not what its
enactors mistakenly thought it meant. 35 Perhaps the ostensible
link between freedom of conscience and "no aid" nonestablishment is like that?
We can avoid this conundrum, however, either by rejecting
the historical claim or by accepting the entailment claim. And
indeed, the historical claim seems hard to square with the historical evidence, because in fact the founding generation does
not seem to have shared the view that the use of tax money for
religious purposes was a violation of anyone's freedom of conSClence.
Some Americans thought this, of course-probably quite a
few. Jefferson is a good example. The famous preamble to his
Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom did not use the term "conscience," but the idea is clearly there: the Bill's eloquent premise
is that "Almighty God hath created the mind free," and the preamble reasons on to the proposition that "to compel a man to
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." 36 We might call
this the Jeffersonian proposition. It is nicely congruent with the
position advocated by Souter, Feldman, and others of a similar
inclination. 37
It is clear, however, that other Americans of the founding
generation rejected the Jeffersonian proposition. The fact that
New Englanders continued for decades to maintain and defend
state support for religion even as they also endorsed freedom of
conscience is powerful evidence that they did not acknowledge
the controversial entailment. 38 For them (as for contemporary
35. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TE\1PTI:-;G OF AMERICA 74--S3 (1990).
36. The bill is reproduced in THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 25-27
(RobertS. Alley ed., 1988).
37. For example, in arguing for a strict "no aid" position in Everson v. Board of
Education, Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion repeatedly quoted Jefferson's proposition. 330 U.S. 1, at 28, 44, 46,60 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
38. Feldman, supra note 33, at 416. Feldman sometimes suggests that even those
who favored state financial support for religion acknowledged, at least in principle, that
freedom of conscience required permitting objectors to opt out or to designate a recipi-
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human rights law), freedom of conscience and nonestablishment
were independent propositions, and one could accept one
proposition without accepting the other.
So the historical claim that Americans largely converged in
believing that public monetary support for religion violates the
consciences of taxpayers turns out to unpersuasiveseparationist wishful thinking, perhaps. But what about the entailment claim? It could be that Jefferson was right (even though
not all Americans were, or are, willing to concede this). Maybe a
taxpayer's freedom of conscience is violated when her tax dollars
are spent on causes to which she is opposed in conscience. We
need to consider the question more closely.
IV. OF COMPLICITY AND COERCED
AFFIRMATIONS
So, is there a good argument that using tax money to further
ends to which a taxpayer is conscientiously (and not merely politically or prudentially) opposed violates the taxpayer's conscience? The question brings us back to Aland Betty. And as we
saw earlier, at least in the abstract the proposition seems plausible. Wasn't this exactly the position taken by Henry David Thoreau, who refused to pay a tax to support the war with Mexico
because he thought the war was morally unjustified? No one was
asking Thoreau himself to pick up his rifle and join the troops,
but Thoreau thought that paying a tax to support the war would
implicate him in the moral offense 39 - and he thereby became
one of our legendary conscientious objectors.
Thoreau's view has its logic. Under the label of "complicity"
or "cooperation with evil," we often regard people who support
immoral activities as sharing in the immorality. People who fund
terrorists are themselves complicit in the terrorism. People who
give money to subversive or traitorous groups and activities are
themselves guilty of subversion or treason. If it would be a violation of your conscience to do X, it should similarly be a violation
of conscience if you pay other people to do X.

ent of their choice for their own financial contribution. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 41.
And typically some such designation was allowed. But again, views differed: the argument that compelling a person to pay taxes to support a religion with which he disagreed
violated freedom of conscience was considered at length and explicitly rejected in Barnes
v. First Parish of Falmowh, 6 Mass. 401, 408-11 (1810), which objected that the claim
"seems to mistake a man's conscience for his monev." /d. at 408.
39. See Henry David Thoreau, On the Dwy of Civil Disobedience (1849).
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So the logic is not implausible. Still, doubts arise. In assessing moral culpability, ethicists often see a crucial distinction between acting voluntarily with the intention of bringing about an
evil and acting with the knowledge that bad consequences may
be an unwanted side effect, but without the intention to produce
those effects. 40 In this vein, we might pronounce a judgment of
complicity on someone who voluntarily contributes money to an
immoral cause with the intention of bringing about an immoral
result. But it is much less clear (Thoreau notwithstanding) that a
person who is compelled by law and against his will to pay taxes
that are used for immoral purposes should be held responsible
for the evil. In addition, the person adjudged to be complicit will
typically have contributed money consciously and specifically to
some immoral cause or activity. The taxpayer, by contrast, pays
money into a general fund which is used to support a whole variety of activities and programs-most of which the taxpayer
knows little or nothing about, and many of which are presumptively beneficial. So again, it is far from clear that the taxpayer
has any responsibility for the fact that some of the money is used
for purposes to which she is conscientiously opposed.
Even more fundamentally, the complicity rationale as described thus far seems too sweeping, or too crude. The rationale
does nothing to distinguish between Al and Betty, or between
conscientious objections to religious and nonreligious expenditures. But as we have noted already, an argument that would operate to excuse from tax obligations everyone who is opposed in
conscience to some use of public money could not be accepted,
because accepting it would wreak havoc on the civil order.
So it seems we need a rationale that is narrower in the scope
of protection it would afford. The statement from Jefferson
quoted above suggests a possibility. What was "sinful and tyrannical," in Jefferson's statement, was not compelling a taxpayer to
pay for ends of which he disapproved, but rather compelling him
40. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Limits of Objectivity, in 1 THE TANNER LECfURES
ON HUMAN VAWES 75, 130 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980):
It is also possible to foresee that one's actions will cause or fail to prevent a
harm that one does not intend to bring about or perrmt. In that case It IS not, In
the relevant sense, something one does, and does not come under a deontological constraint, though it may still be objectionable for impersonal reasons.
See also John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ.
L. REV. 303, 318-19 (1998) (distinguishing between "formal cooperation" with evil,
which is "always immoral," and "material cooperation," which "involves an act that has
the effect of h-elping a wrongdoer, where the cooperator does not share in the wrongdoer's immoral intention'').
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to support "opinions which he disbelieves." The statement suggests that claims of conscience have special force in matters of
expression of opinion or belief. It is not necessarily tyrannical, or
a violation of conscience, to make a taxpayer pay for programs
(a war, for example) to which he is conscientiously opposed. But
it is tyrannical to force the taxpayer to subsidize the promulgation of opinions he disbelieves.
Carelessly considered, modern First Amendment decisions
may appear to provide the material to support this argument.
We might elaborate the argument in the form of two propositions, each of which can claim some support in the modern caselaw. First, the First Amendment protects citizens against compelled affirmations. Government cannot force people, in other
words, to say things they do not believe. 41 Second, for constitutional purposes, money talks. Contributing money to support the
expression of an opinion is itself a way of expressing the opinion.42 From the conjunction of these propositions, it may seem to
follow that government cannot force a person to contribute
money that will be used to support the expression of opinions
the person disbelieves and opposes: to do so would be to compel
an affirmation, which is something the First Amendment forbids.
And this seems to be pretty much what Jefferson asserted.
Modern caselaw does not in fact draw this conclusion, 43 however;
nor could it. Once again, the rationale is simply too broad to be
acceptable. To put the point differently, even the narrower
"compelled affirmation" rationale covers Betty as well as AI. Indeed, the logic of the rationale may fit Betty better than it fits AI.
That is because Betty actually believes that the ideas that she
wishes not to subsidize-evolution, perhaps, or "safe sex" for
teenagers, or any number of other ideas regularly taught in the
public schools-are false and pernicious. She would rather that
they not be taught anywhere; and she certainly has scruples
against supporting their inculcation in any context. AI, on the
other hand, very likely does not think the same of the religious
ideas that he wishes not to subsidize. AI might think this, of
41 The classic case is West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943). For a provocative discussion criticizing this venerable assumption, see Larry
Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147(2006).
42. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
43. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). In a few instances, however, the Court has ruled in favor of persons who objected to being compelled to subsidize speech by private associations. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The limited scope of this right is emphasized in Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).

378

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:365

course: he might be a devout atheist who would like to see religion disappear altogether. But in the America of 1790 or the
America of 2006, it is at least as likely that Al's objection is not
so much to the religious ideas themselves as to public support for
the promotion of those ideas. Al typically will protest that he is
not opposed to religion, and that he is perfectly content to have
such religious beliefs taught in private homes and churches. Indeed, we could easily recast Al as a religious liberal who actually
agrees with the religious ideas in question (whatever they happen to be), who in fact teaches similar ideas in his role as a Sunday School teacher, but who thinks the government should not be
supporting and promoting such ideas. Hence, if Betty is not excused from paying her taxes she can fairly say that she has been
"compel[led] . . . to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which [sjhe disbelieves"; Al may not be
able to say as much.
But our question was whether a plausible argument could
be advanced for recognizing Al's objection in conscience to subsidizing the teaching of religious ideas while refusing to recognize Betty's objection in conscience to subsidizing the promulgation of what she regards as anti-religious ideas. And it seems that
the Jeffersonian contention fails to give us that argument. Its
terms and its logic cover all publicly subsidized "propagation of
opinions" that some taxpayers may "disbelieve" -religious or
not. And given the fact that there are large numbers of citizens
who "disbelieve" all manner of opinions taught in the public
schools or subsidized in other ways, this broader argument is
again one which, as a practical matter, we cannot expect courts
ever to embrace.
So does it follow that the noble sentiments expressed in Jefferson's revered statute were simply misguided? Maybe. But
perhaps we could rescue Jefferson by supposing that he wrote in
a context in which subsidization of Christian ministers was
thought to be just about the only form of public financial support
for the expression of controversial opinions. If we view the matter in this way, then we might conclude that although Jefferson's
view was viable and attractive on his assumptions and for his
time and place, it simply cannot be embraced today in a world in
which government pervasively makes and supports expressions
of controversial opinions.
Either way, there is no apparent excuse for the opportunistic practice by which people like Justice Souter invoke the Jeffersonian proposition selectively to shut down aid for the sup-
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port of some controversial views while blithely failing to notice
that similar subsidies are routinely made available for the support of a whole array of other controversial views. 44
IV. ANTI-RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION?

Our assessment of the entailment claim -or, rather, of its
implausibility-may shed some light on the recurring controversy in which some citizens and Justices accuse other citizens
and Justices of being "hostile" to religion, and in which the accused indignantly deny the charge. 45 We can charitably suppose
that in ruling to invalidate various forms of aid to religion, separationist Justices are not being consciously hostile to religion.
They are simply enforcing a constitutional prohibition as they
understand it. Still, if a principle is consistently enforced against
one set of causes and parties but conveniently forgotten when
other causes and other parties' interests are at issue, suspicions
will naturally arise. 46
Suppose there is a classroom with a rule against talking in
class without permission. The teacher disciplines Susy and Jane
several times for whispering in class, and when they suggest that
44. So, should we conclude that the American commitment to noncstablishmcnt is
based on a mistake, and that the position of international human rights law requiring
freedom of religion and freedom of conscience but not nonestablishment is the sounder
position'! See supra note 18. Not necessarily. The ostensible connection of conscience to
nonestablishment is a theme that has been historically important in this country, but it is
surely not the only reason for favoring a constitutional prohibition on the establishment
of religion. Those other reasons may be more than sufficient to support the American
commitment. In addition, whether or not it was founded on conceptual errors or on conditions that no longer obtain, the commitment to "separation of church and state" is by
now a firmly entrenched feature of the American constitutional tradition, arguably central to our national identity. Tradition itself furnishes a more than adequate justification
for maintaining that commitment. See Steven D. Smith, Separation as a Tradition, 18 J.
LAW & POLITICS 215 (2002).
To be sure, abandonment of the "entailment claim" might make for a somewhat differently shaped nonestablishment commitment. I have already noted, for example, how
the specialized doctrine of taxpayer standing for establishment clause cases arguably
rests on the implicit assumption that public expenditures for religious purposes violate
the consciences of objecting taxpayers, and thereby cause the sort of personalized injury
that allows them to bring suit. Without that assumption, the doctrine of standing might
be different; a different standing doctrine might lead to different cases, and hence a different substantive doctrine on the subject. There is no way to know. But in any case, the
basic commitment to nonestablishment does not seem threatened.
45. See, .e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doc, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist,
1., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion "bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life").
46. Cf Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Newrality toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1010 (1990) (arguing that Justice Stevens' unusual voting pattern in religion cases can best be explained by "hostility to religion").
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she is being mean to them she explains that, no, she is simply enforcing the rule. Rules are rules. But when Carlos and Horace
engage in what looks like similar behavior, the teacher appears
not to notice. If someone asks about this, she says she assumed
that they were "conferring" or doing some other legitimate task.
The teacher might actually believe her own explanations. But
observers will understandably begin to suspect that her real
(though perhaps subconscious) motives must be different than
her announced ones.
By the same token, when people like Justice Souter routinely invoke the sanctity of conscience in supporting the claims
of the Als of the world (even when the Als' claims have a tenuous grounding in the constitutional text) but seem not even to
conceive of the possibility of employing the same reasoning in
behalf of the Bettys of the world (even though the Bettys' claims
have if anything a firmer footing in the text), observers are naturally going to wonder what is really going on.

